Hi all
+1 for all comments from Terry
Few extra thoughts:
- Reliability of Source and other similar evaluation methods used across types of Intelligence are not meant to provide "specific quantification" but rather to “inform” with certain degree of error margin. Then, it’s up to analysts, consumers
(human, products) or policy makers (stakeholders) to “interpret” this and eventually make decisions or informed actions.
- It should be up to specific Technology Products to implement how mapping of this and other evaluation methods or scores into specific numbers actually works when and if needed. I can imagine that end users would want to be able to fine tune
this “formulas” based on specific use cases.
Thanks,
Marko Dragoljevic
VP Technology, Chief Architect
+31 643 919 496
EclecticIQ
Intelligence Powered Defense
https://www.eclecticiq.com
On 09 Sep 2016, at 01:16, Terry MacDonald <> wrote:
I would disagree with using a numbering scheme (and especially one with a range of 0-100), as it makes it much more complex than it needs to be.
Is something that is confidence level 82 really that worse than confidence 83? How is a user going to understand the difference at those small levels of difference? Will they care about the difference at all? Do people really want 6 different
levels of difference rather than 100?
If we use an existing methodology that has been used for many years in the intelligence community such as the Admiralty Code then it is something that is understandable and useable by humans.
I believe they will be able to comprehend the difference between 'Reliability of Source - B - Usually reliable' and 'Reliability of Source - D - Not usually reliable' a lot easier than looking at 'Reliability of Source - 79' and 'Reliability of
Source - 48'.
Cheers
Terry MacDonald | Chief Product
Officer
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M: +64 211 918 814
E:
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On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:39 AM, Jason Keirstead
<> wrote:
I very much like the idea of adding support for the MISP taxonomies, but I still think that confidence should be a numerical value.
I would like to see a way that the admiralty scale taxonomy can be mapped to a numerical equivalent. That way if someone wants to use a different taxonomy because the admiralty scale is either too broad or too narrow, they are free to do so, because we are
not directly mandating it be used.
-
Jason Keirstead
STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems
www.ibm.com/security |
www.securityintelligence.com
Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown
<graycol.gif>Patrick Maroney ---09/08/2016 01:29:55 PM---Good discussion folks. In support of the concepts expressed here, I'd like to raise the topic of su
From: Patrick Maroney <>
To: Dave Cridland <>, JE <>
Cc: "" <>,
"" <>, "Terry MacDonald"
<>
Date: 09/08/2016 01:29 PM
Subject: [cti-stix] MISP Taxonomies [Was: CTI Brussels F2F Meeting...RSVP deadline 5 September]
Sent by: <>
Good discussion folks. In support of the concepts expressed here, I'd like to raise the topic of supporting the MISP Taxonomy format and the public repository of Taxonomies and format for consideration.
https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies
Alexandre Dulaunoy has cleared up concerns raised regarding licensing, so we can assess on the technical merits.
<49458202.jpg>
Patrick Maroney
President
Integrated Networking Technologies, Inc.
Desk: (856)983-0001
Cell: (609)841-5104
Email:
From:
<> on behalf of Dave Cridland <>
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 4:13:31 AM
To: JE
Cc:
;
; Terry MacDonald
Subject: RE: [cti] CTI Brussels F2F Meeting...RSVP deadline 5 September
There's two approaches, both already existing, which can help with this. Firstly, a common, shared policy (and just as important, commonly understood semantics). The FIRST IEP work is along these lines.
Secondly, real security label/classification/policy systems allow one policy to be translated to another, as long as the semantics can be mapped. These systems exist already, and are specified in a slew of documents include
SDN.801(c), X.841, and so on.
Obviously these two are complementary - if there are lots of common semantics in organisation's policies, it makes it easy to express handling requirements, and the existing label specs allow each organization to have
their own policy which they can develop independently.
But all this is already handled by STIX - it's just payload data to STIX and TAXII.
Dave.
On 8 Sep 2016 09:29, "JE" <> wrote:
Hi Terry,
Sorry I was not clear enough in my suggestion and putting it into context… we’re on the same page, there are currently discussions going on in some communities to extend TLP scheme (proprietary) by validation information
and within some schemes used in intel (usually not public / publicly known) this is already existing as part of their schemes. Unfortunately proprietary approaches have their issues when trying to make it work outside the origin.
To enable a true policy-based management, enforcement, priority handling etc. it’s vital to have a standard on assigning & processing level of confidence, trust in source and possibly validation by analyst as well.
Some of the European ISACs I know handle this by reserving some classification levels for members and assign trust-by-default but of course this does not scale beyond limited community nor is it a feasible way to apply it on granular objects.
Cheers from Brussels,
Joerg
From:
[mailto:]
On Behalf Of Terry MacDonald
Sent: Wednesday, September 7, 2016 21:11
To: JE <>
Cc: ;
; Thompson, Dean <>
Subject: RE: [cti] CTI Brussels F2F Meeting...RSVP deadline 5 September
Hi Joerg,
I wasn't meaning information handling or policy management at all, as this is already supported via the object level data marking or granular date marking in STIX 2.0.
I was definitely meaning a way of describing confidence that the threat intelligence is correct, and confidence that the person who told you the threat intelligence gets it right. We had that functionality in STIX 1.x series,
and we've lost it in STIX 2.0.
We need to add it back on as part of STIX 2.1.
Cheers
Terry MacDonald
Cosive
On 7/09/2016 10:25 PM, "JE" <> wrote:
Dear All,
I fully support this – having built some ISACs in industry as well as GOV classification/labeling is usually a “top 5 “ issue … if not at the time of initial set-up than usually later when information from different
sources is to be shared and utilized. This might not be a primary issue from vendor side (although it should be as most TI is not under monolithic policy/license rights but compiled) it is definitely an issue from user perspective to handle, distribute and
leverage TI properly,
Some of the commercially available systems on the market implement labeling/label-based-handling in a proprietary way as current information models/standards do not foresee this. If you e.g. look at OTRS (not a STIX/TAXI
implementation but wide used for Service + Incident Mgt), actually an open source system but during the evolution also included labeling and handling according to this. No matter if e.g. TLP or other schemes are applied I strongly suggest to at least include
the option to label objects and though enable/apply/enforce policy-based information exchange and handling.
Sunny greetings from Berlin & looking forward meeting you guys f2f on later Wednesday evening in Brussels,
Joerg
From:
[mailto:]
On Behalf Of Thompson, Dean
Sent: Wednesday, September 7, 2016 03:06
To: 'Terry MacDonald' <>;
'' <>;
'' <>
Subject: RE: [cti] CTI Brussels F2F Meeting...RSVP deadline 5 September
Hi!,
Can I add my voice in here as well and say that “Confidence” and also having an “Opinion” about Threat Intelligence is very important and is a concept that we use quite heavily when we are exchanging
threat intelligence with other financial organisations and dealing with threat data that comes in via 3rd parties and intelligence
sources.
Can we please ensure that this is included in the agenda and discussed at the meeting ?
Regards,
Dean
From:
[mailto:]
On Behalf Of Terry MacDonald
Sent: Wednesday, 7 September 2016 8:18 AM
To: ;
Subject: Re: [cti] CTI Brussels F2F Meeting...RSVP deadline 5 September
Please say that we are including confidence and opinion object in STIX 2.1 candidate smackdown agenda item at the F2F.
We just can't treat everything that people send out as the absolute truth as we do in STIX 2.0. There is a reason things like the admiralty code were developed.... and that's because threat intelligence is always someone's
opinion.We need a way for the consumer to understand how confident the producer is in the threat intelligence they are sending. It's up to the consumer to determine if they believe that its the truth, and they need various ways to determine this. That's a
ton easier if the person who sent the threat intelligence to you tells you how much they trust the intelligence and trust the source of the intelligence with some form of confidence field.....
I really, really believe this is critical for STIX to work properly, and it was something that made it possible for STIX to automatically be pushed out to the different security tools within an organization (e.g. high confidence
DNS to the DNS RPZ block, low confidence to the alerting on the passive DNS).
These are so easy to add to STIX, we would be remiss to skip it.
Cheers
Terry MacDonald
| Chief Product Officer
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M:
+64 211 918 814
E:
W:
www.cosive.com
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:53 AM, Jane Harnad <>
wrote:
Dear CTI Members,
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please send your RSVP no later than 5 September.
Remote access is available to TC members unable to attend in person.
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You can also dial in using your phone.
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Proposed agenda is attached.
Details on group dinner option: CTI members are invited to sign up to attend a group dinner on Wednesday evening after the F2F. Family members and/or
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