At 11:59 AM 10/23/2003 -0400, Rich Salz wrote:
>Trevor wrote:
>>There's a security concern, if the client asks the server to sign
>>something the server has access to, but the client doesn't.
>
>It is a HUGE security issue. Suppose, for example, the DSS is running on
>a Unix box and I send it a request for an enveloping signature of
>"file:///home/root/passwords" or some such?
>
>Suppose I say "here's the URL I want you to sign", but the URL is one of
>those phony "click here to get off our mailing list" spam things?
I hadn't thought of those. Hmm. I guess I lean towards taking this
out. It's usefulness is as an optimization, but
- you can only achieve that optimization when the doc happens to be on
the web somewhere. Which doesn't seem common,
- it only shifts the burden of retrieving the document from client to server,
- you can achieve the same optimization with client-side hashing,
- and it's risky.
So I think Rich and myself vote against this, Gregor for it. I'm not sure
if anyone else has come down solidly one way or the other?
Trevor
