RE: Things to do - Requirement Document. Security.

From
[ichael Yolotarev
Date
2001-06-22T07:49:06+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: Things to do - Requirement Document. Security.
Hi,
The attached is [a very rough cut of] the security requirements for generic
Vote and Ballot tokens.
It doesn't mention the identification and audit - I don't consider them to
really belong there, in the security section.
Any comments are welcome. << I know that English is not perfect. Feel free
to fix it>>

Regards
Michael

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Krishna Sankar [mailto:]
> Sent: Friday, 15 June 2001 17:35
> To: Michael Zolotarev; 
> Subject: RE: Things to do - Requirement Document. Security.
> 
> 
> Michael,
> 
> 	Good thoughts. Couple of observations:
> 
> |suggest we change the pitch of the message from "SHOULD 
> allow" and "SHALL
> |facilitate" to more permissive and broader "SHOULD NOT 
> prevent" and "SHALL
> |NOT make impossible".
> |
> 
> 	Sounds fine. But there would be many requirements which 
> we might have to
> express in active voice.
> 
> |know - the major participants and items, and associated security
> |expectations.
> 
> 	Keep in mind that we are talking about the requirements 
> of a voting system,
> not just security. So if there are non-security requirements, 
> let us capture
> them and move them to another section in the requirements document.
> 
> |	identification and traceability: << not quite a 
> security issue, though>>
> |	audit, identification and traceability: << not quite a 
> security issue,
> though>>
> 
> 	We need these. Again, we are looking at all 
> requirements, not just
> security. Identification, audit et al are security functions anyway.
> 
> |Structuring security requirements this way will allow 
> keeping it short and
> |sweet, and hopefully better associated with the overall picture.
> 
> 	Short, may be not. Sweet, depends :-) But I have no 
> problem if you want to
> restructure the points. Actually I was writing them as a 
> straight list to
> stimulate thoughts and didn't mean any organization.
> 
> |I believe that vote-casting environment should not be 
> included into the
> |security discussion. It has nothing to do with tokens/protocols.
> 
> 	Again, we need to touch upon the vote casting 
> environment in general terms
> in the requirements section. The more generic the better, but 
> still need to
> include any assumptions, requirements, ...
> 
> cheers
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 



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