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Defining Trusted Voting Process - a one pager

From
David Webber \(XML\) <>
Date
2005-02-24T13:42:25+00:00
ID
02bc01c51a76$9aa3b410$6e01a8c0@DRRW01
Thread
Defining Trusted Voting Process - a one pager
In interaction with the Maryland True Vote folks - 
after munging 

on this these past weeks - I thinking I'm finally 
getting to

be able to distill this into a one pager 
here.

 

The trusted process is based on the three way - 
eVote, paper ballot and 

electoral roll - then scanning of the paper 
ballots, comparing each paper

ballot with its matching eVote and crosschecking to 
the electoral roll 

functions this way:

 

1) Voter checked against electoral roll - given 
access key

    Access key is stored anonymously 
to central log

2) eVoting - voter uses access key and 
DRE to make vote

    selections, confirms, starts 
printing, DRE saves eVote.

3) DRE dispatches selections to print 
device

    Print device creates scannable 
paper VVPAT and

    acknowledges print complete to 
DRE. Print device 

    saves eVote print record. DRE completes voting 
session.

4) Voter deposits VVPAT in ballot box or sends in 
via mail.

5) Repeat for each voter.

6) Ballot closes, ballot boxes and DRE / 
printing media records secured.

7) DRE eVotes tallied.  Prelimary results 
announced.  Paper 

    ballots sent to counting 
centers along with DRE media

    devices.  Everything is 
scanned, counted and crosschecked.

    The VVPATs should match the 
eVoting logs should match the

    access keys given out in 
the central roll log.  Remediate. 

    Declare result, 
or await mailed in ballots to finalize 
result if its

    that close.

 

This gets you a verifiable process.  Then you 
just have to make sure

no one vendor is providing solutions across 
all the steps - and then

you have the separation needed to ensure each must 
conform to

the open process specifications - not their own 
hidden methods.

Every vendor involved should be interoperable with 
every other - 

(e.g. an open marketplace of solution 
providers).

 

And of course the definition of a DRE can 
include equipment in a

polling station, a PC in local library, your personal computer at 

home or work, so long as the software on it is 
certified as 

EML specification compliant from our 
perspective.  Similarly

the electoral roll management and access key 
management

processing.

 

Next step I think is producing a 
nice White Paper that we

can use for positioning EML around this and wording 
this

up into an Executive Overview - rather than just my 
napkin

sketch here....

 

Thanks, DW
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