Ahhh Perception is king, I am afraid.
OK lets look at the "I really have no way too of knowing - just
because I got that email - that my vote was really
recorded that way electronically into the system". true, But nor do you if
you post it.
Has the post lost it??? I have a camera at this moment somewhere in USPS
vans lost now for 5 weeks. Our post office here loses Millions of letters
a year.
Has the little man or lady really verified it or have they just got bored
and thrown it away.
At some point a person has to start believing in something, or at least a
combination of 2 things which is why I like the dual approach. However I
do not see that postal on its own is viable, (UK experience). But I do see
it as being a very good method of verification for e-Voting methods. Which
can be made secure and easy to use.
Bring the 2 together and maybe perception will change. Just as it has with
online purchasing.
Cheers
Simon
<quote who="David Webber \(XML\)">
> Simon,
>
> OK - neato method - certainly an option to give
> people voting remotely. Personally I'd still
> feel edgy about typing in my email address...as
> I have no guarantee what the client software is
> really doing with it.
>
> However - I really have no way too of knowing - just
> because I got that email - that my vote was really
> recorded that way electronically into the system.
> That of course is the point of having the paper
> record in my hand and submitting it as verification.
>
> Cheers, DW
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Simon Bain" <>
> To: "David Webber (XML)" <>
> Cc: <>
> Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 9:35 AM
> Subject: Re: [election-services] Further musings on the need for VVPAT...
>
>
>> David hi.
>>
>> On point 1 you are only partially correct. Yes some part of the process
>> must have details of where to send a confirmation. However not all of
>> the
>> process needs this. In fact it is far better if only one part does.
>>
>> User logs in by a PC passing their login credentials.
>> Server verifies them and sets up a session on a remote database which is
>> encrypted by a hash set at the time the process was started at login.
>> This
>> has with it a SessionId which is internal to the process.
>>
>> This SessionId is passed with seperate undisclosed and unknown (Created
>> at
>> this time) details to the voting server which registers the vote and
>> passes back the SessionId to the verification server. It matches the 2
>> and
>> responds with a "great thanks very much" or an "O I have screwed up"
>> email.
>>
>> The Voting server has no idea who the user is and does not need to know.
>> The SessionId dies before the confirmation email is sent as does the
>> session on the database, which itself holds no identifying details.
>>
>> Yes somebody could hack in at this point. But to decrypt thi slot would
>> take one hell of a rack of servers, a while and details of at least 3
>> seperate IP addressess and login details.
>>
>> Cheers
>> Simon
>>
>>
>> <quote who="David Webber \(XML\)">
>> > More from the Vote Here discussions today.
>> >
>> > Here's what I compiled to support the need for paper
>> > in an all digital process involving DREs only!
>> >
>> > DW
>> >
>> > 1) You cannot have an anonymous trusted verifiable computer
>> > process. eBanking works because it is not anonymous.
>> > Every eProcess out there gets to know your email
>> > address or account ID to send a confirmation
>> > somewhere in the process. If it does not send a
>> > confirmation - then you have no verification - the
>> > DRE is thus reduced to an entertaining arcade
>> > gaming machine - for which you have no
>> > guarantees to actually what reality is.
>> > That theoretical stumbling block is key to
>> > understanding the need for a verifiable paper record
>> > in anonymous voting systems.
>> >
>> > 2) Voters need trust (and US Gov HAVA demands it).
>> > Paper is the most trusted mechanism everywhere.
>> >
>> > 3) The banks have a trusted process that handles
>> > billions of paper cheques annually. Their error rates
>> > are infintesimally small. These technologies are
>> > simple, proven and secure. We need to base a
>> > trusted voting process around such crosschecking
>> > and accounting methods. There will always be
>> > enticing exotic proprietary and uncertified and
>> > potentially compromisable technologies offered
>> > up - but a trusted process needs to be simple
>> > and obvious.
>> >
>> > 4) We need to develop open public specifications
>> > so that there is an open marketplace for solution
>> > providers. This is the lesson of railways, telephones,
>> > automobiles and electricity. The software industry is
>> > no different.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster
>> of
>> > the OASIS TC), go to
>> >
> http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php.
>> >
>>
>>
>> --
>> Simon Bain
>> TENdotZERO
>> 0845 056 3377
>> 44 1234 359090
>> 44 (0) 7793 769 846
>>
>> To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster of
> the OASIS TC), go to
> http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
--
Simon Bain
TENdotZERO
0845 056 3377
44 1234 359090
44 (0) 7793 769 846
