Simon,
I'm only too aware of that. However the USA has this
habit of trying to make everyone else into their model.
That said - of course each country is going to vary this -
it could be as simple as a special window at the post office,
or a box, and extending hours on that one day to permit
extra deliveries - most of them do that for Christmas
and other special holidays.
If that's impossible - guess what - everyone has to
either go to the polling station - or figure out some other
way of mailing ballots.
I was merely illustrating what might work - not what is
perscribed as the only way to do it!
The lesson I was trying to impart was - the more you
can involve the local community in the process the more
EML will succeed.
The last thing people need is some heavily guarded EML
truck with a satellite dish on top turning up in their
neighborhood and being told they can step inside to vote....
Who is trusting who?!?
DW
----- Original Message -----
From: "Simon Bain" <>
To: "David Webber (XML)" <>
Cc: <>
Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 2:31 PM
Subject: Re: [election-services] Further musings on the need for VVPAT...
> David.
>
> Please remember the rest of the world as well. A "standard is only a true
> standard if it is open to all. EML should not just be for the ODPM's
> office in the UK to run with and drop at will, nor should it be the sole
> property of the US and it's ways. If a standard is to work it has to be
> cross border just like XML (£ and $ aside :-) ) is and html. That is
> one of the reasons that they are both so widely taken up.
>
> You know the UK well. Can you imagine our post office staff waiting for
> tax returns and collecting the money? They would riot, and I really cannot
> see myself handing a voting paper to some guy (or lady) on the corner of a
> Moscow street come polling day.
>
> I believe for EML really to take hold it has to stay nationally
> independent, something that in my humble oppinion it has struggled to do,
> and it should concern itself with the message format and also the message
> process. This I believe includes the dual process e-Vote and paper
> confirmation which I agree with. Processes should be looked into and where
> appropriate added. However the implementation of these should be left to
> the election managers. I do not believe that EML has a place for
> implementation of the standard. Guidelines to its' use yes. Specification
> no. This should be down to individual countries laws and where an
> organisation uses EML down to their own rules and internal regulations.
>
> Cheers
> Simon
> <quote who="David Webber \(XML\)">
> > Simon,
> >
> > That's exactly my thinking. Due diligence is required
> > of course. And trust is an essential element.
> >
> > Here in the USA they make a big event out of tax day
> > and processing returns. The post office have staff in
> > the roadway outside the post office till midnight -
> > collecting envelopes - issuing receipts and taking
> > money right there in the street. We all know our
> > local staff and its very much a hands-on event.
> >
> > No reason why you could not have a similar special
> > dispatch around the postal votes too. And as you
> > say its a community thing and that adds to the whole
> > event. You vote at work - and then you drop the
> > envelope off later that day to catch the deadline for
> > the mail-in votes Freepost. I think the USPS error
> > rate on this would be very low.
> >
> > DW
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Simon Bain" <>
> > To: "David Webber (XML)" <>
> > Cc: <>
> > Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 9:54 AM
> > Subject: Re: [election-services] Further musings on the need for
VVPAT...
> >
> >
> >> Ahhh Perception is king, I am afraid.
> >>
> >> OK lets look at the "I really have no way too of knowing - just
> >> because I got that email - that my vote was really
> >> recorded that way electronically into the system". true, But nor do you
> >> if
> >> you post it.
> >>
> >> Has the post lost it??? I have a camera at this moment somewhere in
USPS
> >> vans lost now for 5 weeks. Our post office here loses Millions of
> >> letters
> >> a year.
> >>
> >> Has the little man or lady really verified it or have they just got
> >> bored
> >> and thrown it away.
> >>
> >> At some point a person has to start believing in something, or at least
> >> a
> >> combination of 2 things which is why I like the dual approach. However
I
> >> do not see that postal on its own is viable, (UK experience). But I do
> >> see
> >> it as being a very good method of verification for e-Voting methods.
> >> Which
> >> can be made secure and easy to use.
> >>
> >> Bring the 2 together and maybe perception will change. Just as it has
> >> with
> >> online purchasing.
> >>
> >> Cheers
> >> Simon
> >>
> >>
> >> <quote who="David Webber \(XML\)">
> >> > Simon,
> >> >
> >> > OK - neato method - certainly an option to give
> >> > people voting remotely. Personally I'd still
> >> > feel edgy about typing in my email address...as
> >> > I have no guarantee what the client software is
> >> > really doing with it.
> >> >
> >> > However - I really have no way too of knowing - just
> >> > because I got that email - that my vote was really
> >> > recorded that way electronically into the system.
> >> > That of course is the point of having the paper
> >> > record in my hand and submitting it as verification.
> >> >
> >> > Cheers, DW
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > ----- Original Message -----
> >> > From: "Simon Bain" <>
> >> > To: "David Webber (XML)" <>
> >> > Cc: <>
> >> > Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 9:35 AM
> >> > Subject: Re: [election-services] Further musings on the need for
> > VVPAT...
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> David hi.
> >> >>
> >> >> On point 1 you are only partially correct. Yes some part of the
> >> process
> >> >> must have details of where to send a confirmation. However not all
of
> >> >> the
> >> >> process needs this. In fact it is far better if only one part does.
> >> >>
> >> >> User logs in by a PC passing their login credentials.
> >> >> Server verifies them and sets up a session on a remote database
which
> > is
> >> >> encrypted by a hash set at the time the process was started at
login.
> >> >> This
> >> >> has with it a SessionId which is internal to the process.
> >> >>
> >> >> This SessionId is passed with seperate undisclosed and unknown
> >> (Created
> >> >> at
> >> >> this time) details to the voting server which registers the vote and
> >> >> passes back the SessionId to the verification server. It matches the
> >> 2
> >> >> and
> >> >> responds with a "great thanks very much" or an "O I have screwed up"
> >> >> email.
> >> >>
> >> >> The Voting server has no idea who the user is and does not need to
> > know.
> >> >> The SessionId dies before the confirmation email is sent as does the
> >> >> session on the database, which itself holds no identifying details.
> >> >>
> >> >> Yes somebody could hack in at this point. But to decrypt thi slot
> >> would
> >> >> take one hell of a rack of servers, a while and details of at least
3
> >> >> seperate IP addressess and login details.
> >> >>
> >> >> Cheers
> >> >> Simon
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> <quote who="David Webber \(XML\)">
> >> >> > More from the Vote Here discussions today.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Here's what I compiled to support the need for paper
> >> >> > in an all digital process involving DREs only!
> >> >> >
> >> >> > DW
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 1) You cannot have an anonymous trusted verifiable computer
> >> >> > process. eBanking works because it is not anonymous.
> >> >> > Every eProcess out there gets to know your email
> >> >> > address or account ID to send a confirmation
> >> >> > somewhere in the process. If it does not send a
> >> >> > confirmation - then you have no verification - the
> >> >> > DRE is thus reduced to an entertaining arcade
> >> >> > gaming machine - for which you have no
> >> >> > guarantees to actually what reality is.
> >> >> > That theoretical stumbling block is key to
> >> >> > understanding the need for a verifiable paper record
> >> >> > in anonymous voting systems.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 2) Voters need trust (and US Gov HAVA demands it).
> >> >> > Paper is the most trusted mechanism everywhere.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 3) The banks have a trusted process that handles
> >> >> > billions of paper cheques annually. Their error rates
> >> >> > are infintesimally small. These technologies are
> >> >> > simple, proven and secure. We need to base a
> >> >> > trusted voting process around such crosschecking
> >> >> > and accounting methods. There will always be
> >> >> > enticing exotic proprietary and uncertified and
> >> >> > potentially compromisable technologies offered
> >> >> > up - but a trusted process needs to be simple
> >> >> > and obvious.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 4) We need to develop open public specifications
> >> >> > so that there is an open marketplace for solution
> >> >> > providers. This is the lesson of railways, telephones,
> >> >> > automobiles and electricity. The software industry is
> >> >> > no different.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the
> >> roster
> >> >> of
> >> >> > the OASIS TC), go to
> >> >> >
> >> >
> >
http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php.
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> --
> >> >> Simon Bain
> >> >> TENdotZERO
> >> >> 0845 056 3377
> >> >> 44 1234 359090
> >> >> 44 (0) 7793 769 846
> >> >>
> >> >> To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the
roster
> > of
> >> > the OASIS TC), go to
> >> >
> >
http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Simon Bain
> >> TENdotZERO
> >> 0845 056 3377
> >> 44 1234 359090
> >> 44 (0) 7793 769 846
> >>
> >> To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster
of
> > the OASIS TC), go to
> >
http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Simon Bain
> TENdotZERO
> 0845 056 3377
> 44 1234 359090
> 44 (0) 7793 769 846
>
> To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster of
the OASIS TC), go to
http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php.
>
>
>
