Summary of EU and Trusted Logic Processing

Just reviewing what I posted earlier - I realized I covered off the
frontend of the processing - but needed to call-out explicitly
the need for counting-side ramifications too.

So - referencing the EU requirements:


http://www.coe.int/T/e/integrated_projects/democracy/02_Activities/02_e-voting/01_Recommendation/default.asp#TopOfPage

We need to add 7 points:

1) Explicit reference to the importance of using
    write-once media for vote logging - either paper or digital.

2) Need for voters to be able to physically verify their vote
    directly - not in-directly - via paper ballot or equivalent
    physical representation of an actual ballot - not an
    electronic ephemeral representation, and to cast that
    physical representation by hand.

3) Need to separate the layers of the process - so the same
    component provider is not doing all vote creating, printing,
    and counting the total votes (no single source provider).

4) Need to use two party process and trusted logic
    principle so that the voter can verify that the digital voting
    choice recorded by their interaction with the first party process
    matches the physical voting choice they selected and
    confirmed to them by the second, separate, party to the process.
    A physical representation of the vote should result from this process
    that the voter can directly verify.

5) Need to compare 100% of all counts - electronic and physical ballot
    counts and electoral record counts to ensure they tally.  (Partial
auditing
    will not reveal the required level of support of detection of errors).

6) Explicit call-out of the need to avoid sequential processing information
    compromising vote privacy and anonymonity.

7) Explicitly call-out that counts should be tallied independently for
    each of the sources - electoral roll, eVote selections, print details,
and
    paper ballot counts (after scanning) - and not have one single piece of
    software that reconciles them all.

DW