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RE: Related discussion in the IETF related EDXL, CAP, etc

From
Carl Reed OGC <>
Date
2005-05-17T16:42:26+00:00
ID
008001c55aff$64f9cce0$39fbe304@SusieandCarl
Thread
RE: Related discussion in the IETF related EDXL, CAP, etc
The GeoPriv WG of the IETF has an ongoing dialogue that may be germane to 
the work of the OASIS EM TC. This has to do with Threat analysis and use cases 
for alerts. An example is: 

 

Based on the discussion today, some notes, first on the threat model. At 

a high level, for this discussion, we care about users that place calls 

using wrong location information, for one of two purposes:

(1) 
dispatching resources to a wrong place (here, resources can be 
anything from 
AAA towtrucks to Domino's Pizza to a fire engine) = crank 
call;

(2) 
flooding call centers with lots of calls apparently from different 

individuals and different locations, to overwhelm call takers that need 

to answer the call, determine that there's no human there (but maybe a 

recording) = DOS.

The first case relies on the ability to spoof 
locations, possibly on a 
small scale, while the second relies on the ability 
to create lots of 
different-looking calls in short order. It is easy to 
filter out lots of 
calls coming from the same caller and/or exact same 
location, so that 
type of replay attack is not as major a concern.

We 
can probably agree that dealing with zombie PCs that report their 
correct 
location and identity, but have been owned by a worm, are beyond 
what 
GEOPRIV can fix and is best left to Microsoft and kin. (There are 
some 
things one could do at the application layer if there's an attack, 
such as 
some kind of Turing test to ascertain that the caller is a live 
human being. 
I suspect it is not easy to make this work with 
sufficiently low failure 
rates for children and those with limited 
command of English.)

For 
both cases above, there are two related issues:

(1) limiting the ability 
to perform the attack;

(2) prosecuting the attacker, as this is likely to 
act as a deterrent.

It would be helpful to converge on the threat model, 
without discussing 
solutions. It may well be that either threat cannot be 
addressed in all 
cases.

Carl Reed, PhD
CTO and Executive Director Specification 
Program
OGC

 

The OGC: Helping the World to Communicate Geographically

 

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