[humanmarkup] PBS-Doc-belief

Title: PBS-Doc-belief

This is another of our new elements, and as
such, the discussion also preceeded the formulation of the entry. It
has been added to the Internal Human States Section.

Subject: [humanmarkup-comment] New Base Schema Elements and Attributes
- belief

            
From: Rex Brooks <>

            
To: ,


            
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 06:04:56 -0700

      Hi Everyone,

      Up and at 'em, campers! (or, Good
Morning HumanMarkup!) Here is my

      first pass at the alphabetically first
new element.

      belief

      This is an abstract ComplexType element
that belongs to the attribute

      group humlIdentifierAtts. It does not
use other elements and is not

      used by other elements.

      It is described as a conviction held by
a human or humanGroup of the

      truth of a statement or assertion, or
set of statements or

      assertions. Assertions need not be
verbal. A set of statements or

      assertions can be seen to be
beliefSystems, or signSystems and as

      such are expected to be developed
further

      Note: According to my dictionary there
appear to be two main types or

      kinds of belief: a habitual state of
mind and an evaluation of

      evidence. They are not mutually
exclusive. The extensive discussions

      we have had will largely come to bear
on how belief is developed by

      kinds or types and as beliefSystems
amd/or signSystems which will

      also certainly be included in cultural
descriptions.

      Aspects of belief include
considerations of truth that may be

      contrary to any given belief, and it
may well be that our definition

      of belief needs to be carefully
annotated so that it is understood as

      separate from what might be thought of
as "objective" truth. As such,

      it provides a way to separate a human's
belief from truth per se, so

      that the relationship between a human's
belief or beliefSystem can be

      correlated to that human's
communications and other actions without

      regard for whether the belief or
beliefSystem is more or less

      objectively accurate or true.

      I have tried to keep this atomistic
level definition of belief as

      neutral as possible, which I believe
(gack!) is necessary. I use the

      word believe here to establish a
relative evaluation of the

      usefulness of the Primary Base Element
itself as a foundation for

      further derived and extended elements
in the Secondary Base Schema.

      Heads UP: I will be shortly posting an
example of how I am going to

      correlate our carefully threaded
discussions with the Primary Base

      Schema to show how we arrived at our
specification.

      Can we stand so much fun?

      Ciao,

      Rex

      --

Subject: [humanmarkup-comment] Re: [humanmarkup] New Base Schema
Elements andAttributes - belief

            
From: "Emmanuil Batsis (Manos)"
<>

            
To: ,


            
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 16:24:27 +0300

      Rex Brooks wrote:

       > belief

       >

       > This is an abstract
ComplexType element that belongs to the attribute

      group humlIdentifierAtts. It does not
use other elements and is not used

      by other elements.

      Hey, a complex type belonging to an
attribute group?

      When does "belief" result to
what is considered a "fact"?

      Cheers,

      Manos

To: , Rex Brooks
<>

From: Rex Brooks <>

Subject: Re: [humanmarkup] New Base Schema Elements and Attributes -
belief

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

You know, I have said that about all elements in one way or
another.

It may just be an unfortunate choice of words, it does belong to the
attribute group in a sense, but only because, like all of our
elements, it needs to be a unique name, and that attribute group gives
it an id in addition to a name, so it might be better to say its
attributes include attributeGroup, but all of our element names belong
to the attributeGroup in that sense. Len asked why I don't love
attributes? Here you go. It might be easier to just say all elements
have attributes ID and Name, which is why, I assume, that the
attributeGroup was invented in the first place. I can't say I see much
use in it, except, as in this case, to make a mess of
interpretation.

However, that is XML Schema, and you should look at the HumanML Schema
Len produced way back when, which validates in XML Spy, which I am
following and which I will also probably use, at least to compile all
the various raw versions I want: xml, xhtml, etc. I will edit it them
by hand to fit the OASIS spec for HTML, Word, XML formats for
standards. I only have 30 days to do it, though.

If I have the XML Schema usage incorrect when I produce it, I hope you
correct me quickly. These examinations are all discussions, not code,
so semantics may make it seem that I am saying that an element belongs
to an attributeGroup when what I am actually intending to say that it
shares the attributeGroup as the least, but most fundamental, of its
attributes. If even that is wrong....?

When a human cites a belief, the citation or assertion of the belief
itself is a fact, even if future evidence makes us evaluate the
citation of a belief as false. Belief, in our use of it as an element
on its own merit never achieves objective truth, if that is
what your question is really asking.

It can't, otherwise we have to be arbitrating truth, and we can't do
that. However, it can't be validated as ultimate truth in any event,
quite apart from the fact that we can't put ourselves in the position
of a defining authority. I don't know what or who God is, or even if
there is one of any particular flavor, but I have a pretty good
collection of evidence that we aint it.

The best that could ever be said of a belief in our terms is that this
or that human instantiation claims that it holds a belief that some
statement or assertion is either an article of cultural faith or is
supported by an overwhelming preponderance of cited evidence, but even
that doesn't come close to approaching ultimate truth. Except of
course for faithholders.

In epistemology all you can say is that we have established criteria
by which to judge truth, but not what truth is. All we can do is talk
about how we evaluate evidence and make tests that appear to validate
any given hypothesis.

However, it will always and ever be ONLY an hypothesis.

Phenomenology, my favorite backwater of philosophy, is worse. The best
you can do with that is cite what our senses tell us and qualify that
as a perception, which is highly fallible.

I tried to explain this in my youth to a very bright kid who was on
his way to MIT, except I did not have the correct vocabulary to state
it, and it upset his worldview so bady he never recovered. I've always
felt guilty about that, but feelings don't dictate anything other than
their own subjective reality.

Ciao,

Rex

Subject: FW: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: Ranjeeth Kumar Thunga <>

            
To: 

            
Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2002 02:05:52 -0400

      Rex:  I also think we have enough
fodder for our first draft.  A few

      other comments I have however...

      CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS?

      -----

      Wanted to clarify whether these are
things to consider at this stage or

      not.  Regardless, we can keep
these in mind while we move forward

      (pulling from Len's post):

      Name of belief(s)

      Description of belief

      Proof of belief -- in a subjective
sense (i.e. internal signs we

      express)

              -within our scope

      Proof of belief -- in an objective
sense (i.e. external signs as

      validation)

              -Semantic Web

      Commitment to belief

      Code set for beliefs (Secondary Base
Schema considerations)

              Cultural Sets

              Personal Beliefs

      ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

      -----

      Assertion of fact vs. assertion of
belief:

      As for the distinction between
assertion of fact vs. assertion of belief

      that you mention Len -- I think that
this may fall under "speech

      actions" (i.e. signs) rather than
belief.  When someone believes

      something with a very strong
commitment, then the line blurs between an

      assertion of a fact vs. an assertion of
a belief...for example "God

      commanded me
to destroy America" is asserted as a fact, when in fact it

      is a belief...or at least I think it is
a belief.  To another, it may be

      as 100% as real as "The sun will
shine through my window tomorrow".

      We cannot verify this, as you mention
in your last post Rex, but we can

      verify (or at least provide validation
rules) that demonstrate "the

      degree to which someone believes
something" by evaluating the signs used

      (as Len I believe mentioned
earlier.)

      Commitment to belief: 

      Do we want to provide containers for
helping people commit to sometimes

      flawed and dangerous beliefs? 
Ultimately, I think we do, because our

      mission is simply to best represent
current communication

      characteristics--not change or
manipulate them.  It is up to software,

      not HumanML, to actually help resolve
conflicting, unfounded beliefs.

      As long as we have validation criteria,
in addition to commitment

      quantifiers, I think we will
sufficiently allow for this (e.g. A HumanML

      application can potentially be built to
challenge the belief that

      "America is the Great Satan",
by sifting away the untruths involved in

      such an assertion).

      "Belief", more than most of
the other elements, is where we would

      possibly interoperate with Semantic Web
initiative.  I know that much

      work is underway in the SW effort in
this regard, but I don't know to

      what degree the SW takes into
"human belief" verses simply "assertions".

      SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE

      -----

      The one area I feel we should keep in
mind is the subjective vs.

      objective reality as it may interplay
with beliefs and/or fact.  Not

      that we need to address the underlying
physical model of the universe

      within HumanML, but we may need to
account for the differences in

      subjective/objective models of reality,
if we hope to be interoperable

      in the largest sense.  Don't mean
to open up a can of leaping

      grasshoppers, but I'd like to hear
comments if there are any.

      Ranjeeth Kumar Thunga

Subject: RE: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: Rex Brooks <>

            
To: "Bullard, Claude L (Len)" <>,'Rex
Brooks' <>,'Ranjeeth

            
Kumar Thunga'
<>,

            
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2002 12:08:14 -0700

      I think the rules will emerge from
collecting together the beliefs

      that comprise a belief system by asking
the people who adhere to the

      belief systems to list the beliefs or
the components of the belief

      system, but that is another chunk of
work for another time. I think

      we pretty much have enough for the
first pass at it when we come back

      to it in assembling the first draft
later this month.

      Ciao,

      Rex

Subject: RE: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: "Bullard, Claude L (Len)"
<>

            
To: 'Rex Brooks' <>,'Ranjeeth Kumar
Thunga'

            
<>,

            
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2002 13:12:28 -0500

      I'm not being exact, but yes, a belief
system could

      be constructed from beliefs, but that
requires almost

      something like rules or some way to
state that the

      set of beliefs referred to as a belief
system have

      some relationships that make them into
a system.

      Regardless of what the belief is based
on, physical

      facts, mental states, etc., a belief is
what the

      holder accepts as "true". 
If it is agreed upon,

      it de facto becomes attached to some
larger element

      type such as culture.  A belief
need not be part

      of a system, but it must have a person
or persons

      to assert it.  Beliefs do not
exist independent

      of humans.  Facts do.

      len

Subject: RE: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: Rex Brooks <>

            
To: "Bullard, Claude L (Len)"
<>,'Ranjeeth Kumar Thunga'

            
<>,

            
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2002 11:03:40 -0700

      I think that this approach that Len
describes is more along the lines

      of Belief System than belief as an
atomic element. I think we need to

      be careful about that.

      One can have a belief that the sun will
rise tomorrow, regardless of

      what cultural or social belief system
one adheres to or whether one

      adheres to any particular belief
system. The fact that the sun will

      not rise tomorrow, but the earth will
continue to rotate about its

      axis is actually irrelevent to my
belief because my belief is not

      necessarily based on the science of
physics as we have come to

      understand and accept it.

      Why or how something actually happens
is the truth to which Ranjeeth

      refers and which most reasonably
rational people, as I understand

      THAT set of concepts, agree is
independent of any belief or belief

      system. The idea that the truth might
NOT actually be independent of

      our perceptions and beliefs could also
be true, but we will probably

      not be able to verify it.

      So what I think we should do is to
consider that when we get back

      around to the new elements we need to
consider...

      I am in fact going to hold off on
sending this until I have posted my

      first entry for the next element.
Sigh.

      It is gonna get real busy real
quick.

      Ciao,

      Rex

Subject: RE: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: "Bullard, Claude L (Len)"
<>

            
To: 'Ranjeeth Kumar Thunga'

            
<>,

            
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2002 10:19:27 -0500

      One approach may be to treat belief in
terms of

      commitment by the individual to the
belief.  We

      would need an element model that names
the belief,

      describes the belief, and points to
signs that would

      be expressed as a result of holding the
belief.  This

      would include a quantifier for
commitment that has

      at least two components:  how
strongly the individual

      states that the belief is held, and the
sign set the

      observer can look for as proof of
commitment.  This is

      not different from the ontological
commitment concept.

      The belief itself has to stand alone so
that we can

      have a code set for beliefs that can
then be members of

      cultural sets (what one can assert and
individual may

      hold by being a member of a culture) vs
personal beliefs

      (that which the individual asserts they
hold.  For

      example, I share certain beliefs with
Hindus but I

      am not Hindu by birth or culture.)

      Beliefs would need a discriminator so
that holding an

      assertion of a fact (the sun will rise
tomorrow) and

      the assertion of a belief (God loves
children) can be

      differentiated.

      len

Subject: Re: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: Rex Brooks <>

            
To: Ranjeeth Kumar Thunga

            
<>,

            
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2002 09:42:37 -0700

      I will chime in with an agreement. If
Rob, if he gets this, could

      acknowledge adding belief to the list
of new elements, I would

      appreciate it. I don't think we can
attempt to capture "truth" per

      se, but belief as a basic element of
the human condition, provided

      one is not raised by wolves in the
wilderness, is a valid.

      Ciao,

      Rex

Subject: [humanmarkup-comment] Base Schema-Belief

            
From: Ranjeeth Kumar Thunga <>

            
To: 

            
Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2002 11:09:36 -0400

      After reading Len and Rex's comments
from yesterday, I started to think

      that we may want to add 'belief' as a
Base Schema element.  It is

      tempting to include this within
Secondary Schema within culture perhaps,

      but I
realize that belief is an aspect of ourselves that lead us to use

      the signs we communicate with
fundamentally, just like emotion, and

      intention (which I would like to
continue to explore as well).

      No one argues that there is something
fundamentally "True" in the

      highest sense, although different means
of getting there and

      perspectives: through scientific
method, philosophy, meditation or

      religion.  Belief is our best
approximation of the fundamental Truth.

      Some people may equate their 'belief'
as being 100% equal to Truth, and

      that is where all the problems we are
having come from--i.e.

      fundamentalism.  The big danger,
as both Rex and Len alluded to, is this

      fundamentalism.  By strictly
defining our 'beliefs', we may hinder our

      ability to let ourselves probe further,
and may discourage us from

      casting healthy doubts.

      Thus, in a sense, I feel we are also
missing a unifer "ultimateTruth"

      within our definition, but can't think
of where it might belong.  After

      all, that is what a belief is
ultimately for--to describe an

      'ultimateTruth' that we have yet to
form a unified, verifiable,

      complete, and mutually acceptable
definition of.  Even though some

      persons in the history of man may have
achieved this state of awareness

      through subjective experience, we as a
human race have not reached this

      level through objective
descriptions.

      I'm starting a new thread to be
consistent with our naming scheme,

      although I am cutting and pasting some
of the earlier content. 

      If we can describe belief in some way,
while also being able to exactly

      and specifically point out where the
distinctions may lie, and make it

      clear that beliefs are not absolute
within themselves, then we have a

      better shot at helping dissolve the
conflicts between beliefs.  Rigidly

      held beliefs can be more dangerous if
strictly defined without such an

      allowance.  That may be the
function of Secondary Schema definition, but

      just wanted to keep that in mind.

      --------

      Ranjeeth
Kumar Thunga