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RE: [kmip] Additional modifications to the KMIP specification andusage guide

From
Fitzgerald, Indra <>
Date
2009-09-09T16:48:11+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: [kmip] Additional modifications to the KMIP specification andusage guide
Hi Bruce,

 

We would be including ECMQV for completeness. Adding this 
key structure to the spec should not mandate vendors to implement or support 
this transparent key structure. Similarly, we have included the split key object 
in the spec, but do not expect all vendors to support this 
object.

 

Perhaps we need to include a note in Matt's Conformance 
proposal to clarify that vendors are not expected to support all the Transparent 
Key Structures listed in the spec, but only those that are required by the 
applicable profile.

 

Regards,

Indra

From: Bruce Rich [mailto:] 

Sent: Tuesday, September 08, 2009 6:50 PM
To: Fitzgerald, 
Indra
Cc: 
Subject: Re: [kmip] 
Additional modifications to the KMIP specification and usage 
guide

One minor quibble:  I'm a 
little reluctant to see #1, the ECMQV Key Structure type, given the IPR claims 
around the algorithm.  I'd really be queasy if it were a 
mandatory-to-implement.  If no one else objects, I guess it's OK.  But 
it feels like the camel's nose is in the tent. 

Bruce A Rich
brich at-sign us dot ibm dot 
com

  
  

    From: 
    "Fitzgerald, Indra" 
      <> 
  

    To: 
    "" 
      <> 
  

    Date: 
    09/07/2009 02:55 AM 
  

    Subject: 
    [kmip] Additional modifications to the 
      KMIP specification and usage guide

All,

Last week I uploaded two proposals. One 
proposal addresses the Create Key Pair concern and the other addresses a few 
modifications to the Key Value Type. Judy also uploaded the Revocation Reason 
Code proposal. Please let us know if you have any comments.

During the 
numerous email exchanges with Sean and Judy, the following modifications were 
discussed for the KMIP specification and Usage Guide:

1. In 2.1.7 and 
9.1.3.2.11, add ECMQV. The transparent structure is the same as for ECDH and 
ECDSA.

2. Add HMAC-SHA224 and HMAC-SHA384 to the list in 
9.1.3.2.11.

3. In 9.1.3.2.14, reshuffle and add SHA-224 to the list 
sequentially.

4. In 9.1.3.2.17, add "Unspecified" and "Remove from CRL" 
as revocation reasons to line up with X.509/RFC5280. Remove "Revoked By creator" 
and "Revoked By Administrator". See Judy's Revocation Reason Codes 
proposals.

5. Add an additional Key Value Type for ECPrivateKey. See the 
Key Value Type proposal.

6. Add another Block Cipher Mode Enumeration: 
AESKeyWrapPadding (as described in http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-housley-aes-key-wrap-with-pad-04.txt)

7. Add another Block Cipher Mode Enumeration: XTS.

8. Add 
Certificate Request Type Enumeration CRMF to 9.1.3.2.20. 

9. Change the 
attribute name 'Certificate Issuer' to 'Certificate Identifier'.

10. Add 
a new 'Certificate Issuer' attribute and include the Issuer DN from the Issuer 
field of the certificate and any name formats from the Issuer Alternative Name 
extension. A proposal will follow.

11. Delete the paragraph between Table 
56 and Table 57 to avoid any debate about setting the non-repudiation/digital 
signature bits.

12. Delete the following sentences from the spec: lines 
852-854 and 951-952. We do not want to implicitly change the state of an object 
after a re-key or a re-certify. The spec currently requires the attributes of 
the old key (after a re-key) or certificate (after a re-certify) to be changed 
similar to performing a Revoke with Revocation Reason of Superseded (i.e., the 
object's state will be changed to Deactivated).

13. Include a mapping 
table in the Usage Guide, by taking table 191 (Recommended Curves for ECDSA and 
ECDH) and adding one additional column to show how the bit string and the OID 
map to one another.

The following will only be changed if there is strong 
demand for these changes.

14. Some parameters in the spec, such as D, P, 
and Q, should be lower case letters. This would be inline with the NIST 
standards.

15. There has been discussions to split up 3DES to two 
algorithms: 2-key 3DES and 3-key 3DES. KMIP currently relies on the 
Cryptographic Key Length attribute to determine whether it is 2-key or 3-key 
3DES.

If anyone has any concerns with the above modifications, please let 
us 
know.

Regards,
Indra

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