RE: RSA Interop 2005 Guidelines

From
Ciochon, Robert <>
Date
2005-01-19T19:06:13+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: RSA Interop 2005 Guidelines
Title: RSA Interop 2005 Guidelines

Hi Tom,

Thanks for the feedback.  Please see my comments 
below.

 

Everyone,

I have flagged a few items that I would like additional 
feedback on.  Please respond or I'll bring them up on the 
call.

 

Dave Silver or Terry McBride,

Would you please address Tom's question 
below?

14. Section 4.2 (a question for Enspier). It's not clear 
to me how the eAuth site knows which IDP the user has selected. Are they 
using persistent cookie? I.e., I'm asking this to understand what can or cannot 
be done at the SP. I.e,. if we do the eAuth use case for a couple of SPs and 
then do the logout. Then a new user tries the demo, how does the eAuth portal 
know this is a new request (i.e., the user is no longer logged on to the 
intial IDP)? It would seem that the link back to the eAuth site would require a 
CCID=<idp entity id> parameter much like the one that is sent to the 
SP.  Section 4.2.2 mentions using cookies to avoid propagation (but I don't 
think this will work).

 

Regards,

Bob

From: Thomas Wisniewski 
[mailto:] 
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 
2005 7:18 AM
To: Ciochon, Robert; samldemotech
Cc: Mark 
Joynes
Subject: RE: RSA Interop 2005 Guidelines

Bob, 
nice job putting this together. Here are some comments on the use 
cases/guidelines. 

 

 

1. General question for optional use case: Can we allow users to 
perform additional federations from an SP. I.e., after the user federates, login 
in again, and prior to or after they defederate, they can have the capability to 
re-federate with the defederated IDP or they can have the capability to federate 
with additional IDPs. Obviously this is something that we would take them thru. 
Similar to defederation, which is something that might be done after a user 
leaves the demo site, additional federations could be left up to each 
vendor.
[bobc] I 
think we are all concerned with introducing too much complexity into the demo 
scenarios due to limited amount of time we will have with each customer and the 
amount of time to test and verify each scenario.  The optional use 
case was designed to demonstrate federation clearly and simply.  Could 
someone show more?  Sure, the tools are all there.  But I 
would prefer to keep things as simple as possible at this 
stage. 

 

2. Section 2.1 bullet 5. I'm not sure if this bullet is necessary (i.e., 
bullet 6 is enough). I.e., the use case is always from a solicited SP 
AuthnRequest and not initiated at the IDP.
[bobc] I'll leave it in.  
Better too much... 

 

3. Section 2.2 bullet 7. The text 
says "Initiate a redirect to...". I think you mean to say "Provide a link 
to..."
[bobc] I will 
change that. 

 

4. Section 2.2 bullet 8. We should 
discuss, for the federation case, when the user is required to log 
into the SP. I.e., this can be before the IDP login or after. Are we saying it's 
up to the SP or does it always have to be after the IDP login.
[bobc] We can discuss this 
further on the call to see what people agree 
on. 

 

5. End of section 2.2. You added a 
possible requriement of displaying the xml documents that were exchanged. Do 
users really want to see this? Also, what are you thoughts on how this is 
presented (e.g., thru an external screen/log, or on the actual user browser 
screen)?
[bobc] This 
was a carryover from last year and is up to each vendor if or how they display 
this.  It is basically a trace log to lend some credence to what is 
being shown. 

 

6. Section 3.1 first sentence. You 
say four, but I think you mean three (i.e., login, logout, and eAuth). I think 
that breakdown works the best. I think you should move section 4.2 after the 
logout discussion so it will be section 4.2. Then change sections 4.3 and 4.4 
into 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Basically following the same format/structure you defined 
in the summary section 3.1.
[bobc] I actually meant SP initiated login, idP initiated 
login, SP initiated logout and idP initiated logout as the 4 base 
SAML cases, and then eAuth as a separate 5th case.  I'll have a look 
at the section setups when I update it next 
time. 

 

7. Section 3.1.3, item 2b. s/on the 
SP is/on the SP and is/
[bobc] WIll change 
that. 

 

8. General comment on the optional 
use case. I beleive the SP should state which name id format it is requesting, 
i.e., x509 subj name or a persistent id. This is done via the NameIDPolicy 
element. This implies that the SP site, which lists the IDPs that support 
persistent identifiers, needs to be smart enough to distinguish between the 2 
types of identifiers when calling and IDP. We had said this would be based on 
the user name. However, if the answer to (4) above is that the user logs into 
the IDP before the SP, then the SP does not know who the user is and therefore 
cannot be sure which NameIDPolicy to use. I'm proposing the SP has additional 
smarts in it (each vendor does this however they want) so that the IDP links on 
the SP site hare two-fold. There are links for the base case IDPs and links for 
the optional IDPs. Additionally, the eAuth use case always implies the base case 
IDPs, hence x509 Ssubject names.  Section 6, item 1, wording would be 
updated accordingly.
[bobc] I was heading in that direction myself on the last 
call when people said they could just figure things out from the user 
name.  Let's discuss this some more on the call today since I think your 
method will simplify things for the demo 
staff.

 

9. Section 3.2, item 4 and 5. I 
don't believe this requirement was mentioned on any call/email. I.e., obtaining 
user consent is up to each individual provider. I suppose these could be 
optional steps but they should not be required. I.e., when a user clicks on 
the IDP link at the SP, they are consentng to federation. The same goes for 
section 6 bullet 4.
[bobc] I think it was mentioned in passing when 
discussing this case and was never explicitly called out.  I know this was 
a big deal in the Liberty Alliance specs.  Let's discuss on the 
call. 

 

10. 
Section 3.2, item 8. s/SP triggering/SP via the IDP triggering/  The idea 
being the user does another saml login at the IDP by initiating it at the SP 
(basically a repeat of your item 1). To me it seemed like the text in 
item 8 is suggesting that perhaps the user logs in at the SP. 
[bobc] That is more accurate 
and will be 
changed. 

 

11. Section 3.2, item 9. s/on the 
web page/on the SP web page/
[bobc] I will change 
this. 

 

12. Section 4.1.2, item 3. s/of 
links to the SP resources/of SP resources/ ^ s//(URLs)/  The text suggest 
the links (actual URLs) are to the SP site when they are actually urls back to 
the IDP with some TARGET=xxx or RelayState=xxx query parameter. 
[bobc] I will change 
this 

 

13. Section 4.1.2, item 4. 
s/resource links and/resources and/
[bobc] I will change 
this. 

 

14. Section 4.2 (a 
question for Enspier). It's not clear to me how the eAuth site knows which IDP 
the user has selected. Are they using persistent cookie? I.e., I'm asking 
this to understand what can or cannot be done at the SP. I.e,. if we do the 
eAuth use case for a couple of SPs and then do the logout. Then a new user tries 
the demo, how does the eAuth portal know this is a new request (i.e., the 
user is no longer logged on to the intial IDP)? It would seem that the link back 
to the eAuth site would require a CCID=<idp entity id> parameter much like 
the one that is sent to the SP.  Section 4.2.2 mentions using cookies to 
avoid propagation (but I don't think this will work).
[bobc] Moved up for 
reply. 

 

16. Section 5.1 item 1b. The Saml spec requires subject confirmation 
data, s/MUST NOT/MUST/   and the data should include recipient, 
notOnOrAfter, etc.....  In general I think you can remove section 3. This 
is just a restatement of what is mandatory in the saml spec. I.e., similar 
to saying you need to include an IssuerName, etc....
[bobc] Some carryover from 
last year's doc.  I'll take it out if people find it 
confusing. 

 

17. Along the lines of S3ction 5.2.1 item 1, an AuthnRequest should 
either not inlcude an RequestedAuthnContext element or should value this 
with run:...:Password.
[bobc] Anyone else have feedback on this one?  
It is a carryover as 
well. 

 

18. Section 5.2.1, item 2 
and section 7.1, item 3.  Why are there any restrictions at all on 
SubjectLocality? Shouldn't this just be up to the IDP.
[bobc] I gather this 
was added last year because people had some problems with DNSName.  
Anyone else have feedback on this 
one? 

 

19. Section 5.2.2, item 
1. Is everyone ok, with the 3 attributes. It seems like using postal 
address (someone else suggested this attribute at a prior meeting) would add to 
the personalization features of the demo.
[bobc] Anyone else have 
feedback on this? 

 

20. Section 8.1.1, bullet 1 and 3  AND  section 8.1.2 bullet 2. 
I thought we agreed that there would be one SP resource for each SP and each 
vendor would only have one IDP. So change the zero or more reference to 
there is one of these per vendor. Anything beyond one would complicate the eAuth 
site, the links necessary on each SP/IDP, etc...
[bobc] Not every vendor is 
required to provide both an SP and an idP.  As I recall, someone 
mentioned that last year not all vendors provided both.  That is why the 
zero.   I will change the "more" to 
"one". 

 

21. 
Section 8.1.1, bullet 3. s/URL to the idp logon page/The SAML entity id of 
the IDP/  The entity id format is like a url but it is NOT a url and is not 
meant to be the idp login url.
[bobc] I was using the recommendation in the spec, especially 
since we are only using front channel bindings.  I was trying to make 
it simple, but can change it if it is not accurate for 
our demos. 

 

22. Section 8.1.2 
bullet 3. Actually remove the IDP entity id reference from 8.1.1 and move it 
here, note that this is a URL but an entity id 
only.

 

23. 
Section 8.1.2 bullet 1. For issuer name, is this a string for display 
purposes?
[bobc] I 
believe that is how it was used last 
year. 

 

24. 
Section 8.1.4. I would say copy the list of vendors into A.2 as well. I.e., 
store the value for <Vendor> in the appendix so it's easy to retrieve. 
Also, in A.2 perhaps store the following data point: IDP-Basic, SP-Basic, 
IDP-Optional, SP-Optional to indicate which vendor is doing what. It would be 
really helpful to nail this down before the dry run.
[bobc] I plan to add that in 
somehow once I have who is supporting 
what. 

 

25. 
Section 8.1.4, I would suggest sticking with the same password convention as the 
base case. I.e., the password is the same as the userid. It just makes things 
easier I think.
[bobc] Or should we make just one password that 
is the same for all users for both base and optional?  Anyone 
else have feedback on 
this? 

 

26. 
Section 9.2.2 bullet 5 s/qill/will/
[bobc] I will fix 
that. 

 

27. Section A.2 
and 8.1.1. The additional URLs that are necesary (in A.2 and in 8.1.1) 
include:

- 
SingleSignOnService (at IDP for base and optional 
case)

- 
AssertionConsumerService (at SP for base and 
optional case)

- 
SingleLogoutService (request) (at IDP and SP for 
base and optional case)

- SingleLogoutService 
(response) (at IDP and SP for base and optional 
case)

- ManageNameIDService (request) 
(at IDP and SP for optional case 
only)

- 
ManageNameIDService (response) (at IDP and SP 
for optional case only)
[bobc] Will expand those 
sections 

 

28. Section A.2 
and 8.1.2. The additional identifiers that are necessary (in A.2 and in 8.1.2) 
include:

- 
SP entity id (simliar to idp entity 
id).

- 
Receiver Name (similar to the idp issuer name). I.e., a display name for the 
SP.
[bobc] Will add 
receiver name.  SP entity id is same question as 
idP. 

 

Tom.

  
-----Original Message-----
From: Ciochon, Robert 
  [mailto:]
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 3:17 
  PM
To: samldemotech
Subject: RSA Interop 2005 
  Guidelines

  
Hi, 
Attached is 
  the first cut at defining the guidelines and use cases for the SAML Interop at 
  RSA 2005.  Please send me any feedback, questions, clarifications, 
  etc...

  
Regards, 
Bob 
<<RSA2005-saml-interop.doc>> 

  
Robert Ciochon 
eTrust Development Manager 
Computer 
  Associates 
San Diego, California 
  
(858) 625-6866