On 12/3/2013 10:05 AM, wrote:
>
> See USS Thresher. "Too far, too fast." and look up the term Scope of
> Certification which came into use after that failure.
I remember the Thresher sinking. I was in college then. As best I
understand, the usual practices shipyard practices (brazing, etc) turned
out not be be up to the needs of deep-diving nuclear submarines.
Probably (though I don't really know) the Navy had left the shipyard
work in the hands of those who had always done it, without realizing
that the old ways weren't good enough anymore. [Ironically, it now
appears that the shipyard work wasn't responsible for the sinking after
all - see
http://www.designed4submariners.com/uploads/Docs_Thresher_and_Scorpion_Loss.pdf].
Same thing happened with the B2 bomber, BTW - some prototypes were wired
incorrectly and not in accord with the design, because shop workers used
"standard practice". Also the sub design didn't have much reserve
buoyancy in case of serious trouble. As usual in a complex accident,
there were many factors in play.
At the time I wrote about in my previous post, the Thresher event was
more than a decade in the past. It's demise probably led to the very
high levels of quality assurance that we had to follow.
These events don't repudiate Rickover's achievements, which were in any
case I brought up to show that one-man strong oversight may be possible
but it's always been extraordinary.
