Re: [xri] Minutes: XRI TC Telecon 2-3PM PT Thursday 2009-12-17

From
Creno de [edeiros
Date
2009-12-18T18:35:51+00:00
ID
Thread
Re: [xri] Minutes: XRI TC Telecon 2-3PM PT Thursday 2009-12-17
On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 10:25 AM, Scott Cantor <> wrote:

Will Norris wrote on 2009-12-17:

> (We then had a lengthy discussion about the approaches to XRD trust,

mainly

> between Breno and Scott.  There are a few holes, but I think I captured

most

> of it:)

Pretty well, I wasn't as focused as I should have been, long day of meetings

and local politics. My rants about the uselessness of PKI can be safely

ignored, the world will either continue down that rathole or not, but that's

not our problem here.

Let me try and summarize what I think was basically agreed about, and Breno

can correct me...

We do a base profile that essentially requires the signing certificate and

the XRD Subject to "match", where that implies TLS matching rules (favor URI

or DNS subjectAltName, allow CN). In the DNS case, the matching only applies

to Subject URIs that can be mapped to an http(s) URI.

The profile doesn't call out any use of X.509 extensions to allow or

disallow such signing (but other profiles may). It also doesn't call out the

certificate validation process (but other profiles may).

It also doesn't call out any transport-related requirements for the

acquisition of the XRD, but may note that risks exist if insecure transports

are used. (Note that this means the XRD could be signed by a different

certificate than the TLS certificate one might encounter when obtaining it.)

Yes, however, if the certificate used in the transport is different from the one in signing, a MitM attacker in possession of the signing certificate would be able to successfully negotiate a TLS connection, so it's unclear to me that a document signed this way is actually more susceptible to MitM attackers if not served over SSL.

 

It is, in other words, name matching and that's about it. But it can be

implemented by an XRD library with the signing certificate/chain exposed for

consumption by profiles layered on top of this one.

-- Scott

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--Breno

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